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Book Note
THE MEANING OF PROPERTY: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND
THE LEGAL IMAGINATION, by Jedediah Purdy'
ALEXANDER SCHMITT
IN HIS LATEST WORK, Jedediah Purdy takes as his project an examination of the
place of property in the modern legal imagination. Locating today's theories of
property within their origins, Purdy argues for a way of reconciling the relations
among the purposes that property is now thought to serve. As Purdy notes, legal
thinking about these purposes-whether welfarist, libertarian, or personhood-
oriented-is "fractured, but it is not formless."' By illuminating the relations
between them, he presents a view that takes their ideals as aspects of a single
master value: human freedom, a plural value that Purdy takes to include negative
liberty, the positive capacity to achieve one's capabilities, and the ability to
make choices and commitments lucidly.
To this end, Purdy opens his examination with a return to the theories of
Adam Smith to argue that the virtues of property as first understood were social
rather than economic. According to Purdy, Smith valued ownership (including
of one's own labour) for its power to produce relatively respectful and reciprocal
relationships. In turn, these relationships fostered personalities that were at once
aware of their own interests and the identities and attachments of others-
characters suited to a society of mutual benefit built on persuasion and negotiation
rather than hierarchy and command. Developed in response to early modern
puzzlings over the genesis of social and political order, Smith's view was that
property was the core social institution in the creation and legitimation of that
order. In this vision, human beings are essentially alike in their situation: "needy
but capable, self-interested but sociable enough to band together to solve basic
1. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010) 225 pages.
2. Ibid. at 4.
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problems through collective action, and, especially, able to generate institutions
that promote security and prosperity."' Foremost among these institutions was
property-in Purdy's words, "the most basic institutional expression of our
double character as needy and vulnerable beings who are able to rework the
world in a way that makes provision for our limitations and enables us to
flourish together.""
In illustration of the rise and influence of this vision, Purdy offers a study
of its application in early American transformations of waste law. He shows
how an interest in the economically efficient use of resources, a rejection of
hierarchical social relations founded on claims to land, and the embrace of a
market in land to transform it into a vehicle of opportunity were all inherent in
American property jurisprudence at the time. At the same time, however, as
Purdy points out in his reexamination of Johnson v. M'Intosh, this vision of
progress was not without its hazards. Indeed, as.he illustrates, it provided the
driving force for Britain's rescue of India from native "despotism" and the expro-
priation of North America's inhabited "wilderness."'
Following Smith's vision through its paradoxes and failures to its core
ideal is, however, key to Purdy's project. As he argues in his examination of the
tensions inherent in early American free labour thought and jurisprudence,
reconciliation of freedom's multiple dimensions in a non-coercive economy
may not be easily realized, but that does not mean that this project has no value.
For Purdy, this ideal can be best understood as a utopian aspiration, one that
cannot be expected to be realizable in full but may nonetheless guide our choices
towards ever-closer approximations of it.
In the final chapters of the Meaning ofProperty, Purdy explores the ways in
which we might make such choices and achieve an economic order that truly
values reciprocity, responsibility, and self-realization. Examining propertizing
programs like microfinance, Purdy finds that such an order can indeed hold
promise, but cautions against too simplistic an optimism. As he finds in examining
such issues as climate change, income supports, and intellectual property law,
humanity faces choices where allocating claims on resources involve new and
3. Ibid. at 43.
4. Ibid.
5. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
6. Supra note I at 86.
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basic decisions about how we will live. Although the questions and problems
such choices will generate are in part technical, they are also essentially about
what is right, fair, and dignified. It is Purdy's contention that without a
compelling and corresponding social vision-a vision that we would do well
to resurrect from the foundations the book examines-it is unlikely that we will
be able to answer their challenge.

